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CHAPTER NINE 
RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
The Barnette and Schempp decisions of 1943 and 1963 respectively 
brought free exercise and establishment clause values to their fullest 
expression. But the twenty year period between the two cases was one of 
profound social change. The Cold War, the arms race, internal 
subversion, the civil rights movement, foreign trade, and foreign aid 
were among the dominant political issues in the two decades that 
followed the Second World War. America had by then become the premier 
world political, economic, and military power. Amidst a booming 
economy, a generation of victorious soldiers became the core of a new 
middle class. 
But peace and prosperity ever prove to be fugitive visions. In a 
period of less than nine months in 1963 and 1964, the assassination of 
the President and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution seem in retrospect to 
have triggered a series of shocks that sent the country careering 
through a decade of internal strife and external defeat unlike any 
period since the Civil War and reconstruction. This decade full of 
passionate intensity finally spent itself in the Watergate escapade and 
the collapse of the war effort in Indochina. It has been followed by a 
decade of irresolution which calls to mind William Butler Yeat's comment 
that "the best lack all conviction." In some respects, the Court itself 
has reflected the changing times in a changing of the guard. 
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Doctrinal Entanglements 
The doctrinal tensions noted by Chief Justice Burger, Justice 
Rehnquist, and others has occasionally surfaced in cases that cover 
issues ranging from unemployment compensation and employment practices 
to religious displays on public property and tax exemptions for 
churches. The conflicts have been most clearly evident in regard to 
church property disputes and aid to private schools. But the greatest 
innovations have come in cases involving conscientious objection. 
Church Property 
In the decades before and after its Watson decision, the Court 
ruled upon a variety of church property disputes. Some involved 
bequests, as in Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119 (1866), Christian Union v. 
Yount, 101 U.S. 352 (1880), and Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U.S. 586 (1887). 
Others involved disputes concerning communal property, such as the 
German Separatist colony at Zoar, Ohio in Goesele v. Bimeler, 14 How. 
589 (1852), and the Harmony Society of Beaver County, Pennsylvania--a 
sect known as the Rappites--in Baker v. Nachtrieb, 19 How. 126 (1856), 
and Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 377 (1887). In Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 
How. 288 (1853), the Court was asked to assist in the division of common 
property when the Methodist Episcopal Church split over the issue of 
slavery. But not all the property cases during this period dealt with 
internal church disputes. In Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 
404 (1886), the Court ruled that church land which is left unnecessarily 
vacant is not exempt from local taxes. 
The Court did not base any of its church property rulings on the 
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First Amendment until 1952 when it reversed the judgment of the New York 
courts in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), a case 
involving the right to use and occupy a church that was complicated by 
international politics and Cold War attitudes. Justice Reed reviewed 
the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in America, the 
ecclesiastical disruptions that accompanied the Bolshevik Revolution, 
and the circumstances that led to the temporary administrative 
separation of the American diocese in 1924 until such time as a general 
convention or sobor should be legally convened in Moscow. When an 
admittedly canonical sobor was held in 1945, the delegates from North 
America were prevented from attending because of delays. A year later, 
the American congregations met at a sobor held ~n Cleveland, discussed 
the question of reunion, and decided to refuse the Moscow Patriarchy's 
stipulation that the American church abstain from political activities 
against the Soviet Union. 
As Justice Frankfurter emphasized in his concurring opinion: "What 
is at stake here is the power to exercise religious authority" (344 U.S. 
94, 121). "A cathedral is the seat and center of ecclesiastical 
authority." Because of the turmoil that accompanied Soviet interference 
with the church, the Legislature of New York passed a special act in 
1925 that incorporated the cathedral, which was occupied by the head of 
the American churches. In 1945 and 1948, the legislature added 
provisions to the Religious Corporations Law that recognized the Russian 
Church in America as "an administratively autonomous metropolitan 
district." The archbishop appointed by the Moscow hierarchy challenged 
the validity of this action and called it an interference with the free 
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exercise of religion. The Court agreed with this argument and 
additionally held that New York's legislative application of the cy-pres 
doctrine was invalid, since the case did not involve either the 
dissolution of a charitable corporation for unlawful practives or the 
failure of a charitable purpose. 
Justice Jackson, however, contended that the controversy was a 
matter for settlement by state law and concluded that the religious 
freedom issue was insubstantial. Even if the legislature had resorted 
to a transfer--rather than a confirmation--of property rights that 
resulted in a denial of due process, such an action would only "raise a 
question of deprivation of property, not of liberty:" 
The fact that property is dedicated to a religious use cannot, in 
my oplnlon, justify the Court in sublimating an issue over property 
rights into one of deprivation of religious liberty which alone 
would bring in the religious guaranties of the First Amendment. I 
assume no one would pretend that the State cannot decide a claim of 
trespass, larceny, conversion, bailment or contract, where the 
property involved is that of a religious corporation or is put to 
religious use, without invading the principle of religious liberty 
(344 u.s. 94, 130). 
He characterized the Russian ecclesiastical establishment as a captive 
church and, after describing the case as one involving "an ostensible 
schism with decided political overtones," denied that "New York law must 
yield to the authority of a foreign and unfriendly state masquerading as 
a spiritual institution" (344 U.S. 94, 127, 131 ). 
This did not settle the matter, however, and the dispute came once 
again before the Court on a common law question in Kreshik v. St. 
Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960). Again, the Court reversed. 
Cold War politics also played a major role in First Unitarian 
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958), a case in which 
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issues about church property, test oaths, and conscientious objection 
converged. Under a provision of the California constitution, the tax 
exemption of church property was conditioned on the taking of a loyalty 
oath. As a matter of conscience, the members, officers, and ministers 
of First Unitarian Church refused to comply and denied "'power in the 
state to compel acceptance by it or any other church of this or any 
other oath of coerced affirmation as to church doctrine, advocacy or 
beliefs'" (357 U.S. 545, 547). But Justice Clark, who dissented in this 
and a companion case, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), approved 
the view of the California court which had upheld the requirement: "'An 
exemption from taxation is the exception and the unusual .... It is a 
bounty or gratuity on the part of the sovereign and when once granted 
may be withdrawn"' (357 U.S. 513, 541). He added: "Refusal of the 
taxing sovereign's grace in order to avoid subsidizing or encouraging 
activity contrary to the sovereign's policy is an acccepted practice" 
(357 U.S. 513, 543). This choice of words is unfortunate but revealing, 
since it is in the familiar language of divine right which the crowned 
heads of Europe arrogated to themselves. The law is a veritable 
reliquary of such unamended, and perhaps unexamined, holdovers of the 
tradition of established religion. 
The next church property case, Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial 
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), added a new wrinkle to the Watson doctrine 
when the Court ruled that "there are neutral principles of law, 
developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without 
'establishing' churches to which property is awarded" (393 U.S. 440, 
449). The issue in this case was whether alleged departures from 
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doctrine by the hierarchy of the Presbyterian Church in the United 
States had violated its constitution and terminated an implied trust, 
thus freeing local churches to secede and retain their property. The 
concept of an implied trust was used in the nineteenth century to help 
resolve internal church disputes but often required courts of equity to 
scrutinize doctrinal standards in determining whether the trustees had 
departed from them. The doctrinal departures in question in the Hull 
Church case included the ordination of women, making political 
pronouncements, supporting the removal of Bible reading and prayers from 
public schools, "teaching neo-orthodoxy alien to the Confession of Faith 
and Catechisms," and requiring all member churches to remain in the 
National Council of Churches. 
Justice Brennan declared that it was appropriate for courts to make 
marginal reviews of ecclesiastical determinations and reaffirmed the 
definition of this role that Justice Brandeis gave in the Gonzalez case: 
"'In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of 
the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although 
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular 
courts as conclusive. . "' (280 U.S. 1, 16; 393 U.S. 440, 447). But he 
concluded that "the departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia 
implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at 
the very core of religion--the interpretation of particular church 
doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion" (393 
U.S. 440, 450), a role that is forbidden by the First Amendment. The 
Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court, which ultimately 
resolved the issue in favor of the local church on a different basis. 
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A few months later, Justice Brennan developed his views further 
when he concurred with the Court's per curiam dismissal--for want of a 
substantial federal question--of an appeal in Maryland and Virginia 
Eldership v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970). 
Turning to the Watson, Kedroff, and Hull Church decisions as models, he 
outlined three approaches that he believed were permissible for states 
to adopt in settling property disputes. Regarding the 
"neutral-principles" approach suggested in the last case, he wrote: 
"Under the 'formal title' doctrine, civil courts can determine ownership 
by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws" 
(396 u.s. 367, 371). 
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 
(1976), the Court split over a complicated case involving the defrocking 
of a priest and the resolution of a property dispute. The majority 
found the neutral-principles approach inapplicable in this case and held 
that the courts must defer to the decision of the church's ruling 
hierarchy. But Justices Rehnquist and John Paul Stevens believed that 
the Illinois courts had correctly applied neutral principles of law. In 
addition, they disagreed with the Court's acceptance of the petitioners' 
deference argument: 
Such blind deference is counseled neither by logic nor by the 
First Amendment. To make available the coercive powers of civil 
courts to rubber-stamp ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical 
religious associations, when such deference is not accorded similar 
acts of secular voluntary associations, would, in avoiding the free 
exercise problems petitioners envision, itself create far more 
serious problems under the Establishment Clause" (426 U.S. 696, 
735). 
The Brennan and Rehnquist viewpoints converged in Jones v. Wolf, 
443 U.S. 595 (1979), when the Court upheld Georgia's use of the 
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neutral-principles approach and held that the First Amendment does not 
require the states to "adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious 
authority in resolving church disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal 
controversy is involved" (443 U.S. 595, 605). Justice Blackmun agreed 
that this approach was not free of difficulties but maintained that 
hierarchical churches could take steps to "ensure, if they so desire, 
that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church 
property" (443 U.S. 595, 606). But three justices joined Justice Lewis 
Powell's dissent in the belief that the approach invited intrusion into 
the church polity. 
One result of the Jones decision is the rejection of the implied 
trust concept. According to Dallin Oaks, the justices associated with 
Justice Brennan's viewpoint are even unwilling to examine express trusts 
if they require a determination of religious law or doctrine. Oaks 
believes that a century of precedents will need to be reexamined and 
views the state of church property law as a specimen of the larger 
conflict over the relationship between church and state today: 
The last two decades of the twentieth century are likely to 
involve more frequent legal conflicts between church and state. 
These conflicts are a result of the general growth in government 
regulation of private activities, the expanding role of government 
as a provider of social welfare services traditionally provided by 
churches, the insatiable revenue requirements of govern~ent and 
churches, and the increasing secularization of society. 
Another critic, Robert Recio, agreed with Justice Powell that an 
examination of a church's structure is constitutionally permissible if 
it is limited to determining where authority lies. "Certainly, 
determining the form of church governance as a fact is less dangerous to 
free exercise than presuming church governance to be vested in the 
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congregational majority without regard to the provisions by which the 
parties had agreed to be governed prior to the conflict. n 2 Whether this 
decision does indeed provide an opportunity for intrusion still remains 
to be seen. But this area of the law has become very fluid and the 
status of the Watson rule is somewhat in doubt. 
Religious Tests 
Doubts have similarly intruded into other areas of legal doctrine. 
One area of doubt is what is included in the word "religion" with 
respect to the free exercise and establishment clauses. Changes are 
most evident in cases involving conscientious opposition to oaths and 
obligations that violate personal beliefs. The religion clauses have 
had to do double duty, first as a means of protecting religious liberty 
and second as a defense for any conscientious scruple deemed sincere, 
including avowedly nonreligious or antireligious beliefs. 
The initial departure from a theistic understanding of religion 
came in United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2nd Cir. 1943), a case 
involving conscientious objection. Although Judge Augustus Hand 
affirmed the lower court ruling against the defendant, he broadly 
interpreted the religious grounds for draft exemption: "Religious belief 
arises from the sense of inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the 
individual to his fellow men and to his universe--a sense common to men 
in the most primitive and the most civilized societies" (133 F.2d 703, 
708). Furthermore, Judge Hand held that a conscientious opposition to 
war under any circumstances "may justly be regarded as a response of the 
individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that is for 
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many persons at the present time the equivalent of what has always been 
thought a religious impulse" (133 F.2d 703, 708). Although this shift 
of attention from theology to anthropology--from the commands of God to 
the beliefs of man--was not immediately endorsed by other courts, the 
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new approach gradually gained ground. Justice Frankfurter recalled the 
Kauten opinion in his Barnette and Saia dissents. 
Subsequent cases have played down the traditional conception of 
religion, even to the point of defining away problems with respect to 
official use of religious language. Thus in the Gallagher case the 
Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling that a Sunday closing law 
was unconstitutional and held that "the objectionable language" 
--referring to the law's retention of the term "Lord's day"--was "merely 
a rel~c" (366 U.S. 617, 627). 
But it was in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), that the 
Supreme Court departed for the first time from a theistic definition of 
religion. In a unanimous ruling, the Court held that the prohibition of 
religious tests for office in Article VI applies equally to the states, 
which made this the last of the religion clauses to be specifically 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Black, who 
delivered the opinion of the Court, reviewed the history of test oaths 
and cited the Court's opinion in the Girouard case to the effect that 
the "test oath is abhorrent to our tradition." Ouoting Justice 
Jackson's opinion in the Barnette case, Justice Black underscored his 
own view that church and state must be kept entirely separate and gave 
the definition of religion a new twist: 
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal 
Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief 
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or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass 
laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against 
non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a 
belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded 
on different beliefs (367 U.S. 488, 495). 
In a footnote to the last clause, Justice Black noted several 
nontheistic religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular 
Humanism. In effect, the earlier distinction between religion and "mere 
belief and opinion" had become nearly erased. 
Justice Brennan applied the Torcaso rule two years later in 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), when he stated that government 
may not "compel affirmation of a repugnant belief." This case, which 
was decided on free exercise grounds, involved the ineligibility of a 
Seventh-Day Adventist for unemployment compensation benefits because of 
her refusal to work on Saturday. Under a South Carolina law, a claimant 
was ineligible for benefits if he "'failed, without good cause ... to 
accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office 
or the employer ... '" (374 U.S. 398, 401). 
Justice Brennan believed that, as applied, this rule imposed a 
direct burden on the free exercise of the appellant's religion and could 
·not be justified on the basis of a compelling state interest. "The 
ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her 
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of 
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand" 
(374 U.S. 398, 404). Neither rights or public benefits may be so 
conditioned: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of 
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of 
conditions ~pon a benefit or privilege" (374 U.S. 398, 404). But he 
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denied that the Court was fostering an establishment of religion and 
maintained that the ruling "reflects nothing more than the governmental 
obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences ... " (374 
u.s. 398' 409) . 
Justices Potter Stewart and John Harlan, however, took their cue 
from the recent Sunday law cases and sought to clarify the case's 
establishment clause implications. In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Stewart treated this case as a situation where legitimate free exercise 
claims ran "into head-on collision with the Court's insensitive and 
sterile construction of the Establishment Clause" (374 U.S. 398, 414). 
He wanted to see the Court reverse its Sunday law decisions. Justice 
Harlan, who was joined by Justice White in dissenting, argued that an 
exception on religious grounds would be a permissible accommodation of 
religion. But he disagreed with the Court's "conclusion that the State 
is constitutionally compelled to carve out an exception to its general 
rule of eligibility in the present case" (374 U.S. 398, 423). 
In a case that similarly involved conscientious scruples, In re 
Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963), the Court vacated the contempt conviction 
of a Minnesota woman who refused to serve as a juror because of her 
religious conviction against judging others. 
A religious test of sorts was again the issue in McDaniel v. Paty, 
435 U.S. 618 (1978). This time the Court reversed a provision of the 
Tennessee constitution that disqualified ministers from serving in the 
state legislature, an English rule that had at one time or another been 
observed by thirteen states. The appellant was an ordained Baptist 
minister who had been elected as a delegate to the state constitutional 
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convention. 
There was considerable disagreement, however, as to the 
constitutional grounds for reversing the disqualification and the 
opinions revealed the divisions that had begun to characterize the 
Court's interpretation of the religion clauses. Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, who was joined by three others, took note that the 
disqualification was originally intended to prevent the establishment of 
a state religion. He held that the Torcaso rule, which focused on 
belief, did not apply because the disqualification was directed at the 
status and conduct of the clergy but agreed that it unconstitutionally 
conditioned the minister's free exercise right on the surrender of his 
right to seek office. Justice William Brennan, who was joined by 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, noted that the minister had been disqualified 
because of his leadership role in religion and his dedication "'to the 
full time prpmotion of the religious objectives of a particular 
religious sect.'" He viewed the disqualification as a violation of the 
minister's freedom of belief, then added that it violated the 
establishment clause, as well. Justice Stewart believed that the 
Torcaso decision controlled because this case was virtually 
indistinguishable. Justice Byron White, however, contended that the 
disqualification did not violate the appellant's free exercise right but 
that it did deny him equal protection, noting that the disqualification 
did not extend to judicial or executive offices. 
At various times, Justices Stewart, Harlan, and Rehnquist 
attributed the Court's difficulties to an inability to reconcile its 
treatment of the establishment clause under the incorporation theory 
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with its generous interpretation of the scope of free exercise 
protections. The clashing values are particularly evident in the 
conscription cases, which gave practical effect to the new meaning of 
religion. 
Conscription 
The peacetime draft and the outbreak of the Korean War set the 
stage for the Court's intervention on behalf of the conscientious 
objector claims of two members of Jehovah's Witnesses in Sicurella v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955), and Gonzalez v. United States, 348 
U.S. 407 (1955). In the first case, the Justice Clark contended that 
the petitioner's willingness to fight in a spiritual war between the 
powers of good and evil did not contradict his opposition to 
participating in a shooting war. In the second case, the Court ruled 
that a registrant who was granted a hearing by the Department of Justice 
had a right to have its recommendation furnished him at the time it was 
sent to the selective service appeal board. Justice Sherman Minton 
objected that the Court ignored the congressional test for objectors, 
which held that the opposition must be to participation in war in any 
form. 
After the Torcaso decision, the first test of its expanded 
interpretation of religion came in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 
(1965), a case involving conscientious objection on ethical rather than 
avowedly religious grounds. Taking his lead from the use of "Supreme 
Being" rather than "God" in the law, Justice Clark gave a broad 
construction to the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948 
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and maintained that it provided considerable latitude for exempting 
conscientious objectors: 
We believe that under this construction, the test of belief "in a 
relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is 
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its 
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of 
one who clearly qualifies for the exemption (380 U.S. 163, 
165-66). 
After discussing the implications of various lower court opinions on the 
scope of the religious exemption, he declared that "we believe this 
construction embraces the ever-broadening understanding of the modern 
religious community" and cited the examples of Paul Tillich, John 
Robinson, and David Muzzey, a leader in the Ethical Culture movement who 
advocated an anthropocentric rather than a theocentric view of religion. 
Later, he quoted Paul Tillich's definition of God as a person's 
"ultimate concern:" "what you take seriously without any reservation" 
(380 U.S. 163, 187). Sincerity was thus made the test of belief. The 
shift of focus from theology to anthropology in the Torcaso decision 
shifted once again, this time to psychology. 
The Seeger decision turned the draft law's requirement of belief in 
a "Supreme Being" into an anachronism and in due course it was dropped. 
But first the Military Service Act of 1967 eased the strictures used to 
determine eligibility for conscientious objector status in order to 
bring the law into compliance with the Seeger doctrine. Yet even these 
changes failed to satisfy the Court. In Welsh v. United States, 398 
U.S. 333 (1970), Justice Black equated religion with any sincerely held 
beliefs, including those which are purely ethical or moral in their 
origin and content, such as a personal moral code. The Court's 
construction of the statute, however, flatly contradicted its express 
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language. Justice John Harlan concurred in the result because he 
believed that the theistic standard was unconstitutional, but protested 
what he called this "emasculated construction of a statute to avoid 
facing a latent constitutional question ..•. " After acknowledging 
that he had been mistaken in supporting the Seeger ruling, he reviewed 
the steps that had led to an obliteration of the theistic standard and 
then commented: "It is a remarkable feat of judicial surgery to remove, 
as did Seeger, the theistic requirement. The prevailing opinion today, 
however, in the name of interpreting the will of Congress, has performed 
a lobotomy ..• " (398 U.S. 333, 351). 
Justice Byron White, who spoke for the three dissenters, agreed 
with Justice Harlan's objection to the Court's construction of the 
statue, but disagreed that religious classifications are 
unconstitutional: 
We have said that neither support nor hostility, but neutrality, is 
the goal of the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 
"Neutrality," however, is not self-defining. If it is "favoritism" 
and not "neutrality" to exempt religious believers from the draft, 
is it "neutrality' and not "inhibition" of religion to compel 
religious believers to fight when they have special reasons for not 
doing so, reasons to which the Constitution gives particular 
recognition? It cannot be ignored that the First Amendment itself 
contains a religious classification. The Amendment protects belief 
and speech, but as a general proposition, the free speech 
provisions stop short of immunizing conduct from official 
regulation. The Free Exercise Clause, however, has a deeper cut: 
it protects conduct as well as religious belief and speech .... 
We should thus not labor to find a violation of the Establishment 
Clause when free exercise values prompt Congress to relieve 
religious believers from the burdens of the law at least in those 
instances where the law is not merely prohibitory but commands the 
performance of military duties that are forbidden by a man's 
religion (398 U.S. 333, 372, 373). 
In view of the Court's determination that any religious 
classification must include all forms of belief, it was probably no 
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surprise that the Court next decided to limit the grounds on which a 
religious objection could be made. In two companion cases, Gillette v. 
United States and Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971 ), the Court upheld 
the Selective Service's denial of an exemption to two objectors, one a 
Humanist and the other a Roman Catholic, who were selectively opposed to 
unjust or immoral wars. Justice Thurgood Marshall asserted that the 
petitioners in this case asked for "greater 'entanglement' by judicial 
expansion of the exemption to cover objectors to particular wars'' and 
concluded that "the Establishment Clause prohibits government from 
abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one 
religion, or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect 
or religious organization" (401 U.S. 437, 451 ). He believed that 
fairness was at stake: 
Ours is a Nation of enormous heterogeneity in respect of political 
views, moral codes, and religious persuasions. It does not bespeak 
an establishing of religion for Congress to forgo the enterprise of 
distinguishing those whose dissent has some conscientious basis 
from those who simply dissent. There is a danger that as between 
two would-be objectors, both having the same complaint against a 
war, that objector would succeed who is more articulate, better 
educated, or better counseled. There is even the danger of 
unintended religious discrimination--a danger that a claim's 
chances of success would be greater the more familiar or salient 
the claim's connection with conventional religiosity could be made 
to appear .... While the danger of erratic decisionmaking 
unfortunately exists in any system of conscription that takes 
individual differences into account, no doubt the dangers would be 
enhanced if a conscientious objection of indeterminate scope were 
honored in theory (401 U.S. 437, 458). 
Justice Douglas wrote separate dissents in the two cases. In the 
first, he pointed out that the Court has never squarely faced up to the 
question whether a conscientious objector can be required to kill and 
ended by remarking: "I had assumed that the welfare of the single human 
soul was the ultimate test of the vitality of the First Amendment" (401 
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U.S. 437, 470). In the second, he noted that under Roman Catholic 
doctrine a person has a moral duty to take part in just wars, and to 
refuse to participate in unjust wars, declared by his government. 
Justice Douglas believed that the decision whether a war is just or 
unjust "is a personal decision that an individual must make on the basis 
of his own conscience after studying the facts" (401 U.S. 437, 472). 
Almost as a footnote to the Gillette ruling, the Court held three 
years later in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), that a denial of 
veterans' educational benefits to conscientious objectors who had 
performed alternative service did not create an arbitrary classification 
or a violation of due process. Justice Douglas was again the sole 
dissenter in this case. 
The Court's extension of religious grounds for conscientious 
objection to include objection based on political, sociological, and 
philosophical grounds in the Welsh case began raising questions about 
the fairness of religious classifications. Indeed, it is not altogether 
clear why conscientious objection was ever restricted to a purely 
theistic basis except possibly to silence a potentially major source of 
opposition. But the redefinition of religion by dilution is likely to 
have many unforeseen consequences for the religious liberty guarantees 
of the First Amendment. Shortly after the Seeger decision, Donald 
Giannella wrote that the Court's broadened definition of religion will 
finally compel it to set some clear standards to decide what religious 
practices fall within the protection of the First Amendment: 
This much seems certain: regardless of whether the Court elects to 
proceed under the free exercise clause or the due process and equal 
protection clauses, it must formulate some kind of rudimentary 
natural theology in order to evaluate nontheistic religious claims. 
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One may quarrel with the two main propositions I suggest--first, 
that nontheistic practices seeking to advance individual 
psychological and spiritual development are to be denied equal 
status with sacramental acts of worship; and second, that only 
those nontheistic conscientious objections that are based on 
intensely felt, selfless, and thoroughgoing personal commitment to 
the brotherhood of man should receive treatment equal to 
theistically based scruples. But if the Court does not adopt broad 
guidelines similar to these, it will have to evolve some oth~r 
neotheological criteria to separate the dross from the gold. 
This has not happened yet. Indeed, the Court's treatment of the 
rationale for upholding or denying particular religious claims for 
preference or exemption has been too sporadic to confidently predict how 
it might decide a variety of issues. In recent cases on legislative 
chaplains, tuition tax deductions, federal aid stipulations, and 
religious displays, the Court's decisions cut across the grain of many 
of its previous rulings. It cites the separationist rhetoric of the 
Everson and McCollum decisions but the reality is still a very 
unpredictable, potentially entangling, accommodationism. 
The problem may be even more deep seated than has yet been 
suggested by constitutional scholars. Giannella described the nature of 
the relationship between church and state as it presents itself today: 
In a political society characterized by significant governmental 
disability and wide personal autonomy, religious interests need not 
make special claims to achieve a wide zone of immunity. But in a 
society where governmental regulation is pervasive and individual 
freedom generally limited, religious interests must make special 
claims vis-a-vis5 the state if they are to enjoy an equally wide 
ambit of action. 
It is difficult to argue with the last statement purely as a 
practical matter. But if religion becomes only one more special 
interest to be appeased or special claim to be adjusted, what is then 
left to be said about the intrinsic value of religious liberty? When 
conflicts between church and state occur, it may indicate that 
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fundamental principles of justice have been violated by one or both 
sides. It is often assumed that conscientious opposition to laws on 
principled grounds demands nothing more than an exemption in the absence 
of a compelling state interest. But this approach reduces the 
conscientious principle to the status of a 11 personal truth11 whose 
validity may not be questioned but which is not in any way regarded as 
binding society in its observance. It begs the question whether liberty 
of conscience is protected in the interest of protecting truths that 
make a claim on all of society. If the primary value of the First 
Amendment is to safeguard whatever truths may be gleaned from any 
vantage, then vagueness about the scope of the liberties it protects may 
only compound a common political tendency to ignore critics and reduce 
every argument to a matter of competing interests or points of view. It 
is worth asking, then, whether a polity founded upon certain common 
religious and political principles can successfully operate apart from 
its founding traditions. 
Civil Rights 
The Court has given a fairly broad construction to the religious 
rights of prisoners under the Civil Rights Act. In Cooper v. Pate, 378 
U.S. 546 (1964), it held that a member of the Black Muslim sect may not 
be denied permission to purchase religious publications. 
In another case involving the rights of prisoners, Cruz v. Beta, 
405 U.S. 319 (1972), the Court held that even though a special place of 
worship need not be provided for every faith represented at a prison, 
reasonable opportunities must be afforded all prisoners for the free 
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exercise of their religion, including the holding of religious services. 
But Justice Rehnquist believed that this particular case should have 
been dismissed as frivolous and suggested that it may have been the 
brainchild of an "unscrupulous writ-writer." He called attention to 
what the trial judge had called the "voluminous, repetitious, 
duplicitous and in many instances deceitful" actions previously brought 
by the prisoner. 
In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison and International Association 
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the 
Court reversed a religious discrimination judgment in favor of a former 
stores clerk. The respondent, who had joined the sabbatarian Worldwide 
Church of God in 1968, was originally able to avoid a scheduling 
conflict by transferring to the night shift. Later, when he transferred 
to a different building, he lost his seniority and was required to 
substitute for a vacationing employee on Saturday. The union was 
unwilling to violate the seniority provisions of the collective 
bargaining contract in order to arrive at an accommodation and the 
company fired the respondent after he refused to report for work on 
Saturdays. 
An appellate court ruled that the airline and labor union had 
failed to comply with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, among 
other things, prohibited religious discrimination in employment. But 
Justice White, writing for the Court, resorted to a balancing test and 
held that the company was under no obligation to take steps inconsistent 
with a valid agreement: "Collective bargaining, aimed at effecting 
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workable and enforceable agreements between management and labor, lies 
at the core of our national labor policy, and seniority provisions are 
universally included in these contracts" (97 S.Ct. 2264, 2274). It 
maintained that if the airline had ordered a senior employee to replace 
him, "it would have denied [him] his shift preference so that Hardison 
could be given his" (97 S.Ct. 2264, 2275). 
Justice Marshall, who was joined by Justice Brennan, was troubled 
by a result that compelled "adherents of minority religions to make the 
cruel choice of surrendering their religion or their job." He concluded 
that the Court had ignored the clear meaning of the act. He suggested 
that various alternatives were available to TWA to make a reasonable 
accommodation. 
Church Tax Exemptions 
One area of considerable controversy in recent years concerns the 
nature of the income and property tax exemptions enjoyed by churches. 
Now that churches have been required to make social security payments 
for all of their non-ministerial employees, this issue promises to 
become very acute in 1984. Different philosophies of tax exemption are 
currently in wide circulation. Some argue that they are immunities that 
protect churches from political interference. Other argue that they are 
privileges that may be accorded or denied charitable organizations in 
general. Still others claim that they are subsidies that may not be 
lawfully awarded to churches on establishment clause grounds. 
The Court first weighed the constitutionality of church tax 
exemptions in Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 
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(1970), a case in which the the New York City Tax Commission was sued 
for granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for 
property solely used for religious worship. Chief Justice Burger, who 
wrote for the majority, briefly touched on the establishment isue: "It 
is sufficient to note that for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted 
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign 
in religious activity" (397 U.S. 664, 668). He emphasized the 
difficulties of steering a "neutral course" between the apparently 
competing demands of the religion clauses and proposed a flexible 
approach: 
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all 
that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate 
either governmentally established religion or governmental 
interference with religion. Short of those expressly governmental 
acts, there is room for play at the joints productive of a 
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist 
without sponsorship and without interference (397 U.S. 664, 669). 
But he urged that government involvement with religion is unavoidable, 
adding that "the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an 
involvement of sorts--one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid 
excessive entanglement" (397 U.S. 664. 670). 
Upon a review of the legislative history of the New York exemption, 
the Chief Justice concluded there was no evidence of an intent to 
establish religion, only a desire to spare "the exercise of religion 
from the burden of property taxation levied on private profit 
institutions" (397 U.S. 664, 673). He added: 
We find it unnecessary to justify the tax exemption on the social 
welfare services or "good works" that some churches perform for 
parishioners and others--family counselling, aid to the elderly and 
the infirm, and to children. Churches vary substantially in the 
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scope of such services; programs expand or contract according to 
resources and need. As public-sponsored programs enlarge, private 
aid from the church sector may diminish. The extent of social 
services may vary, depending on whether the church serves an urban 
or rural, a rich or poor constituency. To give emphasis to so 
variable an aspect of the work of religious bodies would introduce 
an element of governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth 
of particular social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of 
continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality 
seeks to minimize. Hence, the use of a social welfare yardstick as 
a significant element to qualify for tax exemption could 
conceivably give rise to confrontations that could escalate to 
constitutional dimensions (397 U.S. 664, 674). 
He drew a distinction between tax exemptions and subsidies and indicated 
that no transfer of funds was taking place, but also sought to balance a 
number of competing factors in order to ensure that the end result of 
the exemption "is not an excessive government entanglement with 
religion." 
The test is inescapably one of degree. Either course, taxation of 
churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement with 
religion. The test is inescapably one of degree. Elimination of 
exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by 
giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax 
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that 
follow in the train of those legal processes. 
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford 
an indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a 
lesser, involvement than taxing them. In analyzing either 
alternative the questions are whether the involvement is excessive, 
and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and 
continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of 
entanglement (397 U.S. 664, 674-75). 
Justice Brennan concurred for the reasons he expressed in his 
Schempp opinion: " ... the line >ve must draw between the permissible 
and impermissible is one which which accords with history and faithfully 
reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers" (397 U.S. 664, 680). 
He contended that the tax exemption of churches is clearly supported by 
the historical evidence: 
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The absence of concern about the exemptions could not have resulted 
from any failure to foresee the possibility of their existence, for 
they were widespread during colonial days. Rather, it seems clear 
that the exemptions were not among the evils that the Framers and 
Ratifiers of the Establishment Clause sought to avoid (397 U.S. 
664' 682). 
Justice Brennan maintained that such exemptions serve two secular 
purposes: they bear community welfare burdens that would otherwise have 
to be met by taxation or not met at all, and they "uniquely contribute 
to the pluralism of American society by their religious activities." 
Like the Chief Justice, he also refused to equate tax exemptions with 
subsidies, reserving the latter term for instances involving "the direct 
transfer of public monies." 
In another concurring opinion, Justice Harlan indicated he was 
concerned about "the radiations of the issues involved," especially the 
potential for political divisiveness if a high degree of government 
involvement is required. 6 But he concluded that churches may properly 
receive an exemption in the context of a broad statute exempting a 
variety of groups, "even though they do not sponsor the secular-type 
activities mentioned in the statute but exist merely for the convenience 
of their interested members" (397 U.S. 664, 697). Moreover, he 
suggested that states "should be freer to experiment with 
involvement--on a neutral basis--than the Federal Government," including 
direct aid. But in a footnote which probably referred to Justice 
Brennan's opinion, he added: "The dimension of the problem would also 
require consideration of what kind of pluralistic society is compatible 
with the political concepts and traditions embodied in our Constitution" 
(397 U.S. 664, 699 n2) .. Wilber Katz, who was an early proponent of the 
policy of neutrality, later commented: 
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Turning the question around, what kinds of pluralistic societies 
may be incompatible with our traditions? This would presumably be 
true of a pluralism in which equal benefits would be given to 
groups from which persons are excluded on grounds of race. Might 
it conceivably be true of a pluralism in which equal favor would7be 
shown to groups which reject the principle of religious liberty? 
For that matter, might it even be true of a pluralism in which equal 
favor would be be shown to groups from which persons are excluded on 
grounds of religion or some other distinctive? 
Justice Douglas, the only dissenter, insisted that a tax exemption 
is a subsidy and remarked that the tax exemption of churches is "highly 
suspect, as it arose in the early days when the church was an agency of 
the state." He contended that the church as a church or as a welfare 
agency must be treated differently than other organizations, "lest we in 
time allow the church qua church to be on the public payroll, which, I 
fear, is imminent." He reiterated a comment by Justice Brennan in the 
Schempp case: "'It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection 
of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil policy, but in 
as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of 
a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the 
government'" (374 U.S. 203, 259; 397 U.S. 664, 711). He concluded with 
a discussion of this "old, old problem" of government aid, which he 
illustrated by citing various objections that had been raised by 
Presidents Madison and Grant, then reviewing a study of real estate 
holdings by churches and statistics on federal grants to private 
religious schools. 
It is difficult to assess whether the Walz ruling, despite its 
support by eight justices, lends much support to an argument for tax 
immunity or mandatory tax exemption. This implication may be drawn from 
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the Chief Justice's remarks on excessive entanglement. But a clear 
statement like the Court's earlier refusal to accept the licensing and 
taxing of colporteurs is missing here. Indeed, Justice Douglas had 
earlier indicated in his Murdock opinion that "a tax on the income of 
one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or 
employed in connection with those activities" is permissible, although 
this does not appear to square with the implications of the Follett 
ruling. In Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412 (1972), 
the Court vacated a lower court decision upholding the validity of a 
recently repealed Florida statute that exempted church property used as 
a commercial parking lot. Justice Douglas dissented. 
By then, the divisions had sharpened in a pair of school aid cases 
that signaled the doctrinal fluctuations that have characterized the 
Burger Court. By the end of the decade, the Court handed down more than 
a dozen separate decisions on this subject. Arguments over fairness, 
neutrality, entanglement, political divisiveness, and secularization all 
came into play. The entire controversy became highly abstruse and 
involuted, much like the pornography and subversive activities cases. 
The debate is likely to continue in this vein until the Court breaks out 
of this self-imposed dilemma and begins grappling with an even more 
basic issues, such as finding solutions that neither burden nor 
subsidize religious schools and their patrons. 
Private School Aid 
The Court's consideration of aid to private schools began in 
earnest with two decisions in 1968. In Flast v. Cohen, 302 U.S. 83 
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(1968), it set the stage by holding that federal taxpayers have standing 
to sue to prevent federal expenditures for the purchase of textbooks and 
other instructional materials. Five separate opinions, including one 
dissent, were written, foreshadowing the fragmentation of the Court on 
this entire issue of school aid. In fact, three justices dissented in 
the first of this series, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 
(1968), which was decided the same day. The Court upheld a New York 
statute requiring school districts to purchase and loan textbooks to 
students enrolled in public and parochial schools. Justice White, who 
wrote for the majority, based his opinion on the child benefit concept 
of the Everson case. He cited the Pierce decision in support of his 
view that "religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and 
secular education:" 
A premise of this holding was the view that the State's interest in 
education would be served sufficiently by reliance on the secular 
teaching that accompanied religious training in the schools 
maintained by the Society of Sisters. Since Pierce, a substantial 
body of case law has confirmed the pm..rer of the States to insist 
that attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy state 
compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide 
minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified 
training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction. Indeed, 
the State's interest in asuring that these standards are being met 
has been considered a sufficient reason for refusing to accept 
instruction at home as compliance with compulsory education 
statutes" (392 U.S. 236, 246-47). 
Justices Black, Douglas, and Fortas dissented separately. Justice 
Douglas concentrated his attack on the ideological nature of textbooks 
by cannily pulling passages from various science and history textbooks 
that supported various religious viewpoints and then asking whether 
these books would be eligible for the program. He believed this 
practice presaged a politicization of the textbook selection process: 
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It will be difficult, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, to say "where 
the secular ends and the sectarian begins in education." People of 
State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S., 
at 237-238, 68 S.Ct., at 478. But certain it is that once the 
so-called "secular" textbook is the prize to be won by that 
religious faith which selects the book, the battle will be on for 
those positions of control. Judge Van Voorhis expressed the fear 
that in the end the state might dominate the church. Others fear 
that one sectarian group, gaining control the state agencies which 
approve the "secular" textbooks, will use their control to 
disseminate ideas most congenial to their faith (392 U.S. 236, 
262). 
What Justice Douglas foresaw regarding the textbook selection 
process has, indeed, come to pass. The reasons for this, however, are 
not exclusively connected with the loans of textbooks. Indeed, the 
problem is inherent in the process due to the ideological nature of 
textbooks, the competing interests that have a stake in their selection, 
and the difficulty of knowing where the sectarian ends and the secular 
begins in education. Recent efforts by state education departments to 
pools their collective purchasing power in order to demand improvements 
have accompanied publicity over the poor intellectual quality of many 
8 textbooks. Part of the difficulty comes from having to please too many 
interests and satisfying none in the process. 
But Justice Douglas's point is well taken. The tender of federal 
or state aid may be characterized as an attractive nuisance. 
Financially pressed colleges and grade schools are often all too willing 
to accept the strings attached to government money. But while it is 
true that many schools erect a secular facade in order to obtain a 
financial edge, the other side of the coin is that over a period of time 
these church-affiliated schools that receive grant money tend to lose 
their identity and their original mission. It is an edge that cuts both 
ways. In France, the price of aid to parochial schools may be ultimate 
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absorption into the public school system. 9 
Three years later, the Court ruled in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672 (1971 ), that federal grant money may be used by church-related 
colleges and universities for the construction of academic facilities 
under the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, but overturned a 
twenty year limitation on a provision that the facilities must be used 
for secular educational purposes. Chief Justice Burger claimed that the 
entanglement problems were minimized because "college students are less 
impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination" (403 
U.S. 672, 686). He also believed that surveillance problems were 
reduced because the "the Government aid here is a one-time, 
single-purpose construction grant" (403 U.S. 672, 688). Three justices 
dissented. 
Lemon v. Kurtzman and its companion cases, Earley v. DiCenso and 
Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971 ), were decided on the same day 
as the Tilton case. These cases involved a Pennsylvania statute 
authorizing salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in 
religious schools and a Rhode Island statute that provided a similar 
"purchase of services" from nonpublic schools whereby the state 
reimbursed the schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and 
instructional materials. The Court ruled both statutes unconstitutional 
but split on doctrinal issues. The Chief Justice wrote the Court's 
opinion but was joined by only three other justices. Justice White 
dissented in one of the two cases. Justice Brennan concurred but sought 
a stronger rejection of school aid by the Court. Justices Black and 
Marshall joined a separate concurring opinion by Justice Douglas. 
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The Chief Justice injected the Court's opinion with an 
accommodationist coloring when he cited the Everson case and remarked 
that the line between permissible and impermissible aid is difficult to 
perceive. He set forth the famous three-part test used--with the 
notable exception of Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983)--in 
subsequent establishment cases: "First, the statute must have a secular 
legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute 
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion'" 
(403 U.S. 602, 612-613). But he emphasized that a total separation 
between church and state is impossible: 
Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state 
requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws are examples 
of necessary and permissible contacts. Indeed, under the statutory 
exemption before us in Walz, the State had a continuing burden to 
ascertain that the exempt property was in fact being used for 
religious worship. Judicial caveats against entanglement must 
recognize that the line of separation, far from being a "wall," is 
a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the 
circumstances of a particular relationship (403 U.S. 602, 614). 
The most revealing part of this opinion, however, was the Chief 
Justice's application of the concept of "divisive political potential," 
which he considered a variety of entanglement: 
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even 
partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic 
system of government, but political division along religious lines 
was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment 
was intended to protect •... To have States or communities divide 
on the issues presented by state aid to parochial schools would 
tend to confuse and obscure other issues of great urgency. We have 
an expanding array of vexing issues, local and national, domestic 
and international, to debate and divide on. It conflicts with our 
whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion 
Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our 
elections that they could divert attention from the myriad issues 
and problems that confront every level of government (403 U.S. 602, 
622-23). 
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This last statement was astonishing in the sweep of its implications and 
the use of political divisiveness as a test has found considerable 
disfavor. But there is evidence that the Court has qualified its 
construction of it. Justices Brennan and Sandra Day O'Connor both 
indicated in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1367, 1375 n9 (1984), 
that the focus of any inquiry into political divisiveness must be "on 
the character of the government activity that might cause such 
divisiveness." 
The Lemon case represented the first time the Court itself had 
struck a law permitting aid to private religious schools. It then 
remanded the case to a trial court for an appropriate decree. But the 
trial court did not prohibit payment for services provided before that 
date. Subsequently, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), known as 
Lemon II, the Court enjoined further payments under an elaborate 
procedure set by Pennsylvania to insure that state payments only went 
for services to services kept free of religious influences, but it did 
not deal with the reimbursement issue. Later, it held in New York v. 
Cathedral School, 434 U.S. 125 (1977), that the schools affected by its 
earlier decisions could not be reimbursed for services they had already 
performed. 
The Lemon ruling inaugurated a series of separationist decisions, 
but the Court's record after 1975 became increasingly uneven. In 
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), the Court held that a 
Mississippi textbook program crossed the line of permissibility because 
it aided private schools that might practice racial discrimination. In 
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 
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472 (1973), ruled as impermissible the reimbursement of private schools 
for expenses incurred in the administration and grading of examinations, 
including traditional teacher-prepared tests. But the Court was more 
clearly divided in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), when it rejected maintenance and repair 
grants, along with tuition reimbursement grants in this case and in 
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). Justice Powell wrote for the 
majority in the Nyquist case that "not every law that confers an 
'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon religious 
institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid" (413 
U.S. 756, 771 ). In Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973), and Byrne v. 
Public Funds for Public Schools, 442 U.S. 907 (1979), the Court 
summarily affirmed decisions rejecting tuition relief schemes. But in 
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 724 (1973), the Court upheld state bond issues 
for the construction of facilities to be leased back to colleges for 
exclusively secular uses. 
The following year, the Court sidestepped a question in Wheeler v. 
Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), whether federal funds could be used in 
teaching educationally deprived children on the premises of private 
religious schools, which was adopted as a means of administering Title I 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Title I had been 
amended to provide federal funding for special programs for 
educationally deprived children in both public and private schools. 
Justice Douglas, who was again the lone dissenter, chided his brethren: 
The plain truth is that under the First Amendment, as construed to 
this day, the Act is unconstitutional to the extent it supports 
sectarian schools, whether directly or through its students. 
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We should say so now, and save endless hours and efforts which 
hopeful people will expend in an effort to constitutionalize what 
is impossible without a constitutional amendment (417 U.S. 402, 
432). 
But hope springs eternal in the human breast. In Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court split over the specific forms 
of permissible aid when it ruled invalid the provision of auxiliary 
service programs and the direct loan of instructional materials and 
equipment, but upheld textbook loans. A year later the still divided 
Court upheld noncategorical grants to public and private colleges in 
Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). The 
divisions finally reached a climax in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 
(1977), when the Court upheld state expenditures for textbook loans, 
standardized test and scoring services, and diagnostic and therapeutic 
services for private school students, but rejected expenditures for 
transportation on field trips and for instructional materials or 
equipment. Six separate opinions--concurring in part and dissenting in 
part--were written. Justice Harry Blackmun, who wrote the first part of 
the Court's opinion, attributed a definite secular purpose to these 
practices: "The State may require that schools that are utilized to 
fulfill the State's compulsory-education requirement meet certain 
standards of instruction, . . . and may examine both teachers and pupils 
to ensure that the State's legitimate interest is being fulfilled" (43 
u.s. 229, 240). 
But three years later Justice Blackmun was among the dissenters in 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 
646 (1980), when the Court held that the Wolman case was controlling and 
upheld direct cash reimbursements to schools that administered 
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state-prescribed examinations and graded them. Justice Blackmun 
underscored the perplexities by citing defections among the judges from 
one side to the other in the course of the decade since the first Lemon 
case. Justice Stevens, who also dissented in this case, aptly 
summarized the entire series of school aid rulings as follows: 
The Court's approval of a direct subsidy to sectarian schools to 
reimburse them for staff time spent in taking attendance and 
grading standardized tests is but another in a long line of cases 
making largely ad hoc decisions about what payments may or may not 
be constitutionally made to nonpublic schools. In groping for a 
rationale to support today's decision, the Court has taken a 
position that could equally be used to support a subsidy to pay for 
staff time attributable to conducting fire drills or even for 
constructing and maintaining fireproof premises in which to conduct 
classes. Though such subsidies might represent expedient fiscal 
policy, I firmly believe they would violate the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment (444 U.S. 646, 671 ). 
Thus disagreements over the application of the establishment clause 
in schol aid cases had brought the Court to a stalemate by 1980. Ever 
since they were devised, the secular purpose and neutral primary effect 
tests have been used to justify policies as variable as the enforcement 
of Sunday closing laws against Orthodox Jews, aid to religious schools 
because they are agents of the state, and the withholding of such aid to 
religious schools because they are not completely secular. shifts among 
the justices and the ad hoc nature of the Court's rulings should not be 
too surprising considering the depth of the underlying problem. A total 
prohibition of school aid, like a denial of religion-based exemptions, 
might then compel the court to examine the establishment implications of 
basic public policies, whether they are the utilization of religious 
schools to carry out secular state purposes or the use of religious 
symbols or values to bolster a sense of community spirit or national and 
local allegiance. The fact that religious schools--and even 
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churches--are incorporated by the state suggests that they may be 
treated as agents of the state. If the Court were ever to adopt this 
view, its implications from a separationist standpoint can only be 
imagined. 
Perhaps the issue is whether a true disestablishment of religion is 
even possible and what a policy of strict separation might therefore 
entail if it were ever practically implemented. The accommodationists 
have persisted in minimizing or ignoring the entanglements involved in 
direct and even indirect aid. The separationists have similarly 
overlooked the already considerable burden the state places on religious 
organizations by setting various requirements and then subsidizing their 
expenses for all schools but sectarian schools. Neither side has been 
able to find a satisfactory common ground and may never do so as long as 
they seek their equally unreachable goals of religious neutrality and 
secular homogeneity. 
Compulsory School Attendance 
By 1972, the Court had already ruled in several cases that clearly 
involved compulsion of religious belief or practice. It had struck down 
various laws and regulations in the Pierce, Barnette, Torcaso, and 
Sherbert cases. On the establishment side of the ledger, the Engels and 
Schempp cases are particularly illustrative. 
After the Sherbert case, the Court handed down another 
groundbreaking ruling in this regard when it restricted the parens 
patriae power of the state in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), 
and permitted Amish children to withdraw from school after completing 
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the eighth grade. Chief Justice Burger reviewed at length the Amish way 
of life and their educational views, noting that "they view secondary 
school as an impermissible exposure of their children to a 'worldly' 
influence in conflict with their beliefs" (406 U.S. 205, 211 ), and that 
they usually establish their own elementary schools. Expert witnesses 
testified that high school age children were taught to be productive 
citizens through a system of learning by doing and contended that high 
school attendance would result in great psychological harm for the Amish 
children and in the destruction of the Old Order Amish community. 
The Chief Justice drew on the Pierce and Sherbert rulings in 
writing his opinion: 
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high 
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable 
regulations for the control and duration of basic education. . . . 
Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of 
a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, 
made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent 
education in a privately operated system. . . . As that case 
suggests, the values of parental direction of the religious 
upbringing and education of their children in their early and 
formative years have a high place in our society .... Thus, a 
State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, 
is not totally free from the balancing process when it impinges on 
fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically 
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and 
the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious 
upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of 
Pierce, "prepare [them] for additional obligations" (406 U.S. 205, 
213-14). 
Drawing on the Sherbert test, he declared: "A regulation neutral on its 
face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional 
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free 
exercise of religion" (406 U.S. 205, 220). 
The Chief Justice also reviewed the origins of compulsory school 
attendance laws, associating them with the movement to prohibit child 
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labor, and rejected "a parens patriae claim of such all-encompassing 
scope and with such sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable 
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application as that urged by the State" (406 U.S. 205, 234). But the 
decision was a narrow one that not greatly influenced subsequent state 
actions. Justices Stewart and Brennan concurred with the observation 
that Wisconsin had sought to brand the parents as criminals for 
following their religious beliefs. Justice White placed a narrow 
construction on the Court's decision and commented that the 
administration of an exemption for Old Order Amish "will inevitably 
involve the kind of close and perhaps repeated scrutiny of religious 
practices . • which the Court has heretofore been anxious to avoid" 
(406 u.s. 205, 240). 
Justice Douglas, however, dissented on the grounds that the 
children had not been examined by the Court to determine their own 
wishes in the matter. He also did not believe that the "law and order" 
record of the Amish was relevant and remarked that a religion is a 
religion regardless of the criminal records of its members. But he 
conceded that "if a group or society was organized to perpetuate crime 
and that is its motive, we would have rather startling problems akin to 
those that were raised when some years back a particular sect was 
challenged here as operating on a fraudulent basis'' (406 U.S. 205, 246). 
Referring to the polygamy decisions, he predicted: 
Action, which the Court deemed to be antisocial, could be punished 
even though it was grounded on deeply held and sincere religious 
convictions. What we do today, at least in this respect, opens the 
way to give organized religion a broader base than it has ever 
enjoyed; and it even promises that in time Reynolds will be 
overruled (406 U.S. 205, 247). 
Richard E. Morgan has represented the ruling as a major doctrinal 
420 
innovation: 
. . . Yoder . . . suggests that Burger may be in the process of 
persuading himself that "no-entanglement" is an altogether 
independent value; that there is no establishment clause violation 
absent of entanglement. Government may create favored 
classifications for the religious so long as it does not 
administratively intermeddle .... The free-exercise clause has 
now grown far beyond the confines of Reynolds, and it is 
problematical whether the Burger Court, even if a majority wisf.Zd 
to, could reduce free-exercise to its pre-Sherbert dimensions. 
But in fact the Yoder case was narrowly decided and, to date, 
remains a singular exception. Those who expected a higher profile for 
the free exercise clause have had a long wait. The other shoe has yet 
to drop. As in the Sherbert case, the Court simply balanced the free 
exercise and establishment considerations, tipping them in favor of the 
free exercise values. But there is no indication that the Court is 
willing to extend such exceptions. Years earlier it had let stand 
without comment a lower court ruling in Donner v. New York, 342 U.S. 884 
(1951 ), that upheld compulsory attendance at state-approved elementary 
schools despite its effect of inhibiting religious liberty. 
In the absence of a clear standard of religious practice, the Court 
has had to continually wrestle with the problem of where and how to draw 
the line between free exercise rights and the interest of society in 
being "left free to reach actions which [are] in violation of social 
duties or subversive of good order" (98 U.S. 145, 167). Given the 
breadth of the social behavior compassed by the word religion, the 
difficulties raised by Justice Douglas are not to be lightly dismissed. 
The ingenuity of state legislatures and local officials in discovering 
new ways of either favoring or restricting religious behavior should not 
be discounted. Very often the prevailing attitude is that where there 
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is a will there is a way. These ways are many and varied. If one does 
not suffice, there are many others to call upon. Thus in legal battles 
over government subsidies or regulations, the final outcome is most 
likely to be determined by the larger purse. 
Synthesis 
Several recurring motifs knit the Supreme Court's pronouncements on 
religious issues throughout its history. The later free exercise and 
establishment clause tests draw upon political and religious 
perspectives that span several centuries. 
The major theme is a variation of the state religion motif. This 
is the idea that the state, as the sovereign, is the parens patriae over 
the people of the land, including the church. The Holy Roman Emperor 
claimed to be the vicar of Christ. The later French and English 
monarchs were awarded such titles as Most Christian King and Defender of 
the Faith and the church was one of the great estates of the realm. The 
first Oueen Elizabeth became Head of the Church of England. Political 
power was always expected to be vested with spiritual authority. 
Napoleon's act of crowning himself thus had great significance, as did 
his dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. Together they symbolized the 
end of the idea of a united Christian Europe. 
The institutions of the state, some of which predate ancient Rome, 
are religious in origin. Their current identification with secular 
regimes does not in the least detract from their religious significance 
but it has nevertheless changed the character of the relationship 
between church and state. From the viewpoint of the church, the state 
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is still obliged to be "a minister for good." E. R. Norman maintains 
that a total separation of religious belief and public life was never 
contemplated by the religious dissenters who sought to disestablish and 
remove "the privileged and exclusive state churches" and insists that 
"an overwhelming majority of men still believed in the confessional 
office of the state."13 But the church of today no longer serves as the 
conscience of the state. This role is claimed by academia, the press, 
presidential advisers, the courts, and congressional committees. Of 
course, the question of who will guard the guardians remains the 
perennial problem under any regime. 
The nature of the current disestablishment of religion is such that 
the political participation of the church must be fairly circumspect. 
The spiritual authority of the church still receives considerable 
deference. But as an organization that holds property and makes 
pronouncements on politically sensitive issues, the church is generally 
treated as one among many competing interest groups. Many of the 
accoutrements of state religion have survived their original functions, 
but they are not placed in the service of avowedly secular purposes with 
the stipulation that they use the least restrictive means consistent 
with state interests and be religiously neutral in effect. 
The minor theme of the Court's rulings on religion is the perennial 
quest to maintain a constitutional balance between compelling state 
interests and religious liberties. Assuming that the state is not 
simply a neutral arbiter of competing interests with none of its own, it 
will tend to favor some religions over others despite all intentions to 
the contrary. Whatever may be said about the justice of the rulings 
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themselves, the admitted religious bias of the Reynolds and Davis 
rulings was a more predictable and more realistic judicial standard than 
the professed religious neutrality of the Everson and Lemon cases. If 
religion can include practically any idea or activity, then the 
constitutional importance of religion is likely to suffer in the 
interests of maintaining order. 
By disestablishing religion, the judiciary has not thereby avoided 
the pitfalls of state religion. It has simply disguised the nature of 
the conflict. Religious activities that do not show their colors enjoy 
an advantage over those that do. It is difficult to imagine that a 
teacher might be prevented from teaching classical, Marxist, or 
Keynesian economics on the grounds that this would be an establishment 
of religion. But Justice Black articulated a fundamental problem in his 
Epperson dissent when he suggested that the evolutionary theory has a 
religious bias. Evangelical Christians, for example, will be found on 
almost all sides of any of these issues. But the significant fact here 
is that the issues themselves are politically and religiously divisive 
because they raise basic questions of a religious nature. While 
interpretations and applications of biblical teachings respecting 
creation, tithing, just weights and measures, employment practices, and 
property may differ, the issues are no less religious in the context of 
a political discussion than in a church setting. The secularization of 
the Sunday closing laws does not make them any less of a religious 
establishment than the secularization of the Christmas holiday in the 
recent Lynch case. To maintain otherwise, as Justice Brennan suggested 
in the latter case, is to trivialize the institution. 
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The free exercise tests used in the Reynolds and Davis cases appear 
to have begun losing ground with the Murdoch, Ballard, or Torcaso 
decisions. The Seeger and Welsh cases took the redefinition of religion 
to such an extreme that its usefulness as a definition of conduct--as 
opposed to mere belief--has been terminated. It was with the Sherbert 
ruling, however, that the free exercise clause acquired for the first 
time an independent status from other First Amendment considerations. 
Along with the Yoder decision, it represents a unique attempt to ensure 
free exercise values and, as such, may remain highly exceptional. Not 
only a clear and present danger but a compelling state interest may be 
generally cited as restrictions upon free exercise values. But it 
appears that the Reynolds and Davis tests, which defined religion more 
narrowly, might not have necessitated the kind of balancing between 
religious and state interests that has resulted. Had these rulings 
served more completely as a model for later doctrinal refinements the 
Court might have avoided creating a tension between the free exercise 
and establishment clauses by taking a narrower view of each. Perhaps 
this would have vindicated Justice Harlan's assertion in the Sberbert 
case that the "situations in which the constitution may require special 
treatment on account of religion ... are few and far between" (374 
u.s. 398, 423). 
Assuming that the modern state is less guided by its religious 
traditions than ever, the conflicts between state interest and religious 
conscience may be expected to increase. ln this context, it is not 
special treatment for dissenters but a careful review of priorities that 
is required. Different perceptions of power, mcrality, and the common 
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good are often at work whenever fundamental religious values--including 
those of the state--come into conflict. The issues themselves are often 
short-lived and are rarely brought to general public attention, but they 
are dominated by recurring themes that may be indicative of more general 
problems of public policy. As a record of the shifting battle lines, 
the agenda at the Conference on Government Intervention in Religious 
Affairs, which was held in the Spring of 1982 in Washington, D.C., is 
especially illuminating: 
1 . Efforts by state and local governments to regulate fund-raising 
by religious bodies 
2. Efforts to require religious bodies to register with and report 
to government officials if they engage in efforts to influence 
legislation (so-called "lobbying disclosure" laws) 
3. Efforts by the National Labor Relations Board to supervise 
elections for labor representation by lay teachers in Roman 
Catholic parochial schools (which have been halted by the U. S. 
Supreme Court) 
4. In te.rnal Revenue Service's definition of "integrated 
auxiliaries" of churches that tends to separate church-related 
colleges and hospitals from the churches that sponsor them and 
to link them instead to their "secular counterparts" 
5. Attempts by state departments of education to regulate the 
curriculum content and teachers' qualifications in Christian 
schools (which have been halted by state courts in Ohio, 
Vermont, and Kentucky, but upheld in Nebraska, Wisconsin, and 
Maine) 
6. Attempts by federal and state departments of labor to collect 
unemployment compensation taxes from church-related agencies 
that hitherto were exempt, as churches are 
7. Imposing by the (then) Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare of requirements of coeducational sports, hygiene 
instruction, dormitory and off-campus residence policies on 
church-related college (such as Brigham Young University) which 
have religious objections to mingling of the sexes in such ways 
8. Efforts by several federal agencies (Civil Rights Commission, 
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, Department of Health 
and Human Services, Department of Education) to require 
church-related agencies and institutions, including theological 
seminaries, to report their employment and admissions 
statistics by race, sex, and religion, even though they receive 
no government funds, with threats to cut off grants or loans to 
students unless they hire faculty, for instance, from other 
religious adherences 
9. Sampling surveys by the Bureau of the Census of churches and 
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church agencies, requiring them to submit voluminous reports 
under penalty of law, even though the Bureau admitted to a 
church attorney that it had no authority to do so, but refused 
to advise churches that they were not required to comply 
10. Grand jury interrogation of church workers about internal 
affairs of churches 
11. Use by intelligence agencies of clergy and missionaries as 
informants 
12. Subpoenas of ecclesiastical records by plaintiffs and 
defendants in civil and criminal suits 
13. Placing a church in receivership because of allegations of 
mismanagement of church funds made by dissident members 
14. Granting by courts conservatorship orders allowing parents to 
obtain physical custody of (adult) offspring out of unpopular 
religious movements for purposes of forcing them to abandon 
their adherence thereto 
15. Withdrawal by IRS of tax exemption from various religious 
groups for failure to comply with "public policy" 
16. Determination by IRS of what is "religious ministry" by clergy 
to qualify for exclusion of cash housing allowance from 
taxable income (often in contradiction to the religious body's 
own definition of "ministry") 
17. Redefinition by the civil courts of ecclesiastical polity, so 
that hierarchical bodies are often in effect rendered 
congregational with respect to their ability to control local 
church property, and dispersed "connectional" bodies are 
deemed to be hierarchical with respect to their ostensible 
liability for torts committed by local ertities, contrary to 
their own self-definition in both cases14 
So far, the Supreme Court has directly addressed only the third, 
fifteenth, and seventeenth of these items. The lower courts have ruled 
on several others, many of which are treated in the remaining chapters. 
But this listing and the examples that follow only scratch the surface 
of a problem whose depths have yet to be fully explored. They are 
simply the tangible expressions of a basic dilemma: how to protect 
religious liberty when the political and legal institutions themselves 
are fundamentally religious in their origins and effects. 
The potential points of conflict are practically limitless, but for 
the remainder of this dissertation the issues are divided into three 
categories: fiscal, educational, and social regulation. Each category 
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raises different but related questions. For example, where is the line 
to be drawn regarding fees, taxes, and subsidies, such as educational 
vouchers and tuition tax credits? The Supreme Court has recently 
decided unfavorably in regard to the religious tax exemptions claimed in 
United States v. Lee, 102 S.Ct. 1051 (1982), and Bob Jones University v. 
United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983). In the area of education, does 
the free exercise clause have any bearing on mandatory curriculum 
standards and teacher certification requirements? And in regard to 
social regulation, should churches and church schools have a free hand 
in helping to shape the face of their communities? In Larkin v. 
Grendel's Den, 103 S.Ct. 505 (1982), the Court held that churches may 
not be empowered to effectively veto the location of a liquor store in 
their immediate neighborhood. 
Changing practical circumstances have considerably altered the 
character of the basic separationist and accommodationist positions. 
Neither position is necessarily hostile to religious liberty, but either 
one may be used to suppress religious liberty. Judicial doctrine has 
reached such an impasse that it may be time to change the terms of 
debate. It is hoped that the discussion which follows will provide some 
assistance toward restructuring the political alternatives and 
reconstituting the conscience of the state. 
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